AQUINAS
ON THE
EMOTIONS
American Protestant Ethics and the Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr
William Werpehowski

Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good
Susanne M. DeCrane

A Call to Fidelity: On the Moral Theology of Charles E. Curran
James J. Walter, Timothy E. O’Connell, and Thomas A. Shannon, Editors

Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History
Charles E. Curran

The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas Since Vatican II
Richard A. McCormick

Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel
Julia Fleming

Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of Longing
Maura A. Ryan

The Global Face of Public Faith: Politics, Human Rights, and Christian Ethics
David Hollenbach

The Ground Beneath the Cross: The Theology of Ignacio Ellacuría
Kevin F. Burke

Heroes, Saints, and Ordinary Morality
Andrew Michael Flescher

Introduction to Jewish and Catholic Bioethics: A Comparative Analysis
Aaron L. Mackler

John Cuthbert Ford, SJ: Moral Theologian at the End of the Manualist Era
Eric Marcelo O. Genilo

Josef Fuchs on Natural Law
Mark Graham

Loyal Dissent: Memoir of a Catholic Theologian
Charles E. Curran

The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II
Charles E. Curran

Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine
Aaron Stahnaker

Prophetic and Public: The Social Witness of U.S. Catholicism
Kristin E. Heyer

The Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic Anthropology
Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler

Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, and Change
Lisa Sowle Cahill

United States Welfare Policy: A Catholic Response
Thomas J. Massaro

Portions of “Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Upheavals of Thought,’” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 31, no. 2 (2003): 325–41, are reprinted here as part of chapter 3 with the permission of Wiley-Blackwell.


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cates, Diana Fritz.

Aquinas on the emotions : a religious-ethical inquiry / Diana Fritz Cates.

p. cm. — (Moral traditions series)

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.


BJ255.T5C38 2009

241’.042092—dc22

2009006666

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

15 14 13 12 11 10 09  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First printing

Printed in the United States of America
With love for Rick, Ben, and Hannah
And in memory of J. Giles Milhaven
This page intentionally left blank
# Contents

Acknowledgments xi  
Introduction 1  

**Chapter One**  
Religious Ethics 21  

**Chapter Two**  
Religious Ethics and the Study of Emotion 40  

**Chapter Three**  
Approaching Aquinas on the Emotions (I) 62  

**Chapter Four**  
Approaching Aquinas on the Emotions (II) 80  

**Chapter Five**  
Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from Below (I) 103  

**Chapter Six**  
Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from Below (II) 129  

**Chapter Seven**  
Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from Above (I) 164  

**Chapter Eight**  
Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from Above (II) 191  

**Chapter Nine**  
The Formation of Distinctively Human Emotions 213  

**Chapter Ten**  
The Religious-Ethical Study of Emotion 241  

**Appendix**  
Aquinas on the Powers or Capabilities of a Human Being (Relevant Selections) 267  

Bibliography 269  
Index 277
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgments

My first exposure to the philosophical study of emotion was long ago in a course taught by Karen J. Warren, then of St. Olaf College. She taught with such skill and passion that I continue to feel the power of her mind after all these years. Very few scholars at the time were taking the emotions seriously as a topic of philosophical study. Karen was a trail blazer. In graduate school at Brown, I had the good fortune to study with several teachers who encouraged me to pursue this neglected area of study. I am grateful to J. Giles Milhaven, my mentor and friend, who taught me to love—and to argue lovingly—with Thomas Aquinas. Giles passed away while I was writing this book. I am also grateful to John P. Reeder Jr., who has been a faithful and astute commenter on my scholarship for many years; to Sumner B. Twiss, who continues to contribute to my intellectual and professional development in countless ways; and to Martha C. Nussbaum, who deepened my appreciation for the remarkable things that ancient philosophers can teach us about the emotions and, indeed, about life. It was Martha who urged me to write this book.

Specifically with regard to this project, I am indebted to many people, for many different things. Jock Reeder and Edward Vacek offered extensive, penetrating comments on every chapter of an earlier draft. Keith Green brought to the project a keen mind and the heart of friendship. Jonathan Schofer provided remarkable perspective on the project as a whole and on matters of method. Many other colleagues read and offered helpful comments on a full draft of the manuscript, including Stephen Pope, William McDonough, Nancy Menning, Michele Petersen, Abbylynn Helgevold, Christine Darr, and Nancy Hauserman. Other colleagues who assisted me with various parts of this project, through conversation or the gift of their scholarship, include Jean Porter, Christopher Mount, Thomas Lewis, James Gubbins, Howard Rhodes, Jordan Copeland, Richard McCarty, and Ezra Plank. Many of the ideas in this book were developed through conversations with additional colleagues in the Society of Christian Ethics and graduate students in my Aquinas seminars. For the spiritual, emotional, and bodily support that kept me (more or less) in one piece, I extend thanks to Sara Pamela Star, Angelika Kieffer, Wendelin Guentner, Rachel Gordon, Lori Baldwin, and my mother, Donna Fritz.
I have received generous institutional support from the University of Iowa. I am grateful to my colleague and the chair of my department, Raymond Mentzer; to Dean Linda Maxson and Executive Associate Dean Raúl Curto of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences; and to Jay Semel and the staff of the Obermann Center for Advanced Studies. I benefited greatly from being an Obermann Scholar. This book was supported by a Career Development Award from the Office of the Provost and an Arts and Humanities Initiative Grant from the Office of the Vice President for Research.


I am thankful for everyone at Georgetown University Press who worked on this book, especially Richard Brown, the director of the press, who provided astute advice and enthusiastic support at every stage, and to James Keenan, who agreed to include the book in his Moral Traditions series.

Finally, my husband, Rick Borchard, has been loving, encouraging, and patient beyond belief during the long time it took to write and revise this project. He has seen me through many challenges and kept me from losing sight of my goal. My children, Ben and Hannah, have lifted me up with their affection and trust and provided many unspoken assurances of the fundamental goodness of life, even in the face of tragedy. From these remarkable people, and from the rest of my family and friends, I have learned much about love. If Aquinas’s thought did not illuminate, deepen, and extend this love, I would not have continued my long conversation with him.
All of us want to live happily and well. We want this not only for ourselves but also for others who are part of us or closely connected to us. When something happens that appears to bear notably on our own or a loved one’s well-being, a situation forms and holds our attention. We receive impressions and make judgments about what is happening and about how it concerns us. More than this, we are moved by what we apprehend. We might not be moved outwardly, in the form of physical movement, but we are moved inwardly.

Imagine that the phone rings. You answer and hear the voice of a friend with whom you have not had the chance to talk for months. She sounds happy and you feel elevated. As the conversation unfolds, you have the sense that you are drawing close to her and she is drawing close to you. You resonate with pleasure in the simple goodness of this relationship—in the way that you are poised to unite with her and she with you, in thought, by phone, or in person. When the conversation ends, your friend is drawn away from you into other aspects of her life. You are drawn back into your previous activities. Yet your friend remains vaguely present to you. You rehearse parts of the conversation, smiling.

Imagine that five minutes later the phone rings again, and you answer cheerfully. This time, however, it is a person with whom you have a difficult relationship. At the sound of his voice you experience a kind of dissonance. You recoil inside and your defenses go up. Every time you talk to this person he says something insulting. You replay a set of his past comments as you listen (and fail to listen) to what he is saying now. One part of you tends away from the person as you suffer the pain of old and new injuries. Another part of you tends toward the person as you fantasize about “knocking him off his high horse.” When you hang up the phone, you go on and on, in your mind, about how awful this person is. You begin to attack yourself for not saying something to put him in his place, but you withdraw your attack as you recollect past attempts that have only made matters worse.

Then you hear a knock at the door. Startled, you become aware that you have been lost in a dark reverie for nearly half an hour. “Come in!” The door drifts open and a colleague appears, looking pale. She says, “I’m afraid I have some bad news.” You learn that another, valued colleague has been in a car accident and is undergoing emergency surgery. Instantly, the situation that had preoccupied you since that last phone call is gone from your mind. As
you picture your colleague lying on an operating table, bleeding, surrounded by bustling people in scrubs, connected to beeping monitors, you are initially stunned. You feel pinned, unable to move inside. Then you begin to extend yourself in his direction. By the power of your imagination you encircle him with your concern. You think of his wife and child and draw them into the circle as well. You are buoyed by the thought that your friend has made it thus far, and he is surely in good hands. A few moments later, your imagination drifts back to the gravity of the situation. You stiffen and shudder. The threat of death is creeping in like low-lying fog.

Many of us flow into and out of such states throughout the course of a day. Our responses to similar situations might take different forms. The details of our lives, such as our upbringing, cultural context, education, gender, social location, and the history of our relationships, all make a difference. Yet there are patterns that we can recognize. What are these patterns? What are the interior motions that many of us call “emotions”? How ought we to understand them? This book analyzes the writings of medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas in order to elucidate one powerful way of thinking about our emotions. I will explain shortly why I turn to Aquinas. Consider first why it is important to seek greater understanding of our emotions.

THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTION

When we are under the influence of an intense emotion, it is as though we enter a different world. A situation that appears to bear on our own or another’s well-being commands our attention. Other things happen to us and around us, but many of them escape our notice. The things we do notice, we tend to construe in a particular way, in terms of the scenario that is playing out before us. Seeing things from this viewpoint, and being moved by what we see, we tend to act in predictable ways.

Imagine once again the first situation above. The emotion you experience when you hear your friend’s voice, and picture her on the other end of the phone, will likely dispose you to treat her kindly. She might tell you that she has realized a difficult goal. At hearing this news, you tend toward her, in your imagination, as though you were rushing up to her and giving her a hug or a high-five. You praise her. When she tells you of a personal loss, you receive some of the weight of her sadness and hold it for a moment. Then you are drawn toward her, as if to her side. You express concern and offer your help. Your friend asks how you are doing. Within the context of your drawing near to her—and her tending toward you—many of your problems seem insignificant. Those that are serious feel less weighty than they did before.
you picked up the phone. When the conversation ends, you turn to the rest of the day with a positive attitude. You are prone to show kindness to the next person who crosses your path, unless it is someone whom you habitually regard in a negative light.

Now recall the second conversation with the person who says insulting things. The emotion that is aroused by his voice, by the image of him on the other end of the phone, will likely dispose you to act somewhat differently. For example, it might make it difficult for you to do your work. So much of your mental energy is invested in picturing the other’s distorted face, rehearsing his words, developing a story line that makes you look like the victim in the situation, fantasizing about payback, and so on, that you cannot concentrate on the material you are to read. Your productivity drops, and this has an impact on the people who rely on you. Behaving like a stormy center of power pushing back on another center of power, you might rush down the hall oblivious to a third person whose eyes are searching yours for recognition.

For good or for ill, an emotion can affect the way we function as moral agents. It can affect our thoughts, perceptions, desires, judgments, deliberations, decisions, actions, and interactions. Particularly if an emotion is intense, arises with great frequency, or lingers for long periods of time, it can affect the quality of our lives and our relationships. It is thus important to understand our emotions and bring ethical reflection to bear on them.

THE MORALITY OF EMOTION

Our emotions can have an effect on our moral lives, but can we, as moral agents, have an effect on our emotions? Are our emotions the sorts of things over which we have any choice? Are they the sorts of things for which we can be held responsible? There are definitely limits to our capacity to influence the ways in which we are moved by the situations we confront. Some of our interior motions and the behaviors to which they give rise are quite automatic. Humans seem to have evolved to respond immediately to certain stimuli before there is time to think. Yet most emotions are more than knee-jerk responses. They are relatively intelligent responses that unfold over time, partly in response to ongoing thinking. There are points in the unfolding of an emotion at which it becomes possible for us to subject our emotions to the power of choice. Inasmuch as an emotion affects our own or another’s well-being, and we have some choice in its regard, the emotion is something for which we have a degree of moral responsibility.

First, we are ordinarily responsible for the way we act while under the influence of an emotion. I am not referring here to bodily reactions and
behaviors over which we (or some of us) have no control, such as letting out a shriek and jumping on the nearest chair at the sight of a mouse running across the floor. I refer to actions that we commit, which most of us believe we have the freedom not to commit, such as staying up on the chair for a long time or getting down and setting a trap. If we feel impelled to act on an emotion, such as fear or anger, the ideals of virtue require that we be aware of ourselves feeling so impelled and that we judge whether it would be fitting to act as our emotion impels us to act. We are required to make choices we can justify to other reasonable people.

Second, we are responsible, to some extent, for the way we feel our emotions. With most emotions—even those that arise under the influence of higher-level thinking about the significance of a situation—we cannot help our initial, interior movement. A situation captures our attention and triggers a response before we know what is happening. However, we can help whether we consent to this initial movement. That is, we can exercise some influence, in subsequent moments, over whether we continue to feel the emotion in the way we currently feel it. The very act of observing our emotion and asking the question of whether it is appropriate to the situation—or whether we are overreacting—changes the emotion in subtle ways. When we observe and wonder about our emotion, the object of our emotion (namely, the situation of concern, as we perceive or imagine it) is less capable of commanding our attention in a narrow and exclusive way. We put the object in broader perspective, which allows us to view it from more than one angle. Our interior tending with respect to the object is more flexible, less programmed.

We are responsible, in effect, for creating some mental space around our emotion. Moreover, we are responsible for trying to direct the course of our emotion, as needed, so that it reflects the light of reason. In other words, we are responsible for trying to feel our emotion in a way that exhibits good human functioning. It is not a simple matter to determine whether our own or another person’s way of experiencing a particular emotion is appropriate to a situation. We humans have different ideas about what is good for us and for other humans. Yet many of us can probably think of cases in which we would say that a person’s emotion is fitting, and the way in which the person directs the course of his or her emotion is praiseworthy, while we can think of other cases in which we would say that a person’s emotion is unfitting, and the way in which the person indulges that emotion, feeds it, or fails to give it direction is blameworthy.

Consider, for example, a middle-aged man who realizes that he no longer feels the emotion of love he used to feel toward his wife. There are still mo-
ments when he feels it, but these moments occur rather infrequently. When he does feel love, the feeling is not as intense as he would like it to be. The man cannot honestly say that his wife has become less lovable. It is his own attitude that has changed, for reasons he does not fully understand. Motivated to improve the quality of his life and marriage, he sets out to cultivate his love for his wife. In particular, he sets out to feel the emotion of love for her more frequently and intensely. Let us say that after much creative effort he begins to feel such love arising more often and ardently, in a way that rejuvenates his life and marriage. I would regard such love (in principle) as morally good, and the man as praiseworthy for feeling it as he does. His emotion is a fitting response to his wife and their marriage, an important moment within the rhythm of a good marital friendship, and he has had a hand in shaping that response.

Consider another example. A woman is consumed with the emotion of ethnic hatred for her new neighbor. Her hatred reflects a lifelong pattern of demonizing a group of people and refusing to consider the possibility that “those people” have any redeeming qualities. Once in a while, as the woman is experiencing this hatred, she has an inkling that there is something unfair about it. She senses that the neighbor could be more than he appears (as the object of her hatred) to be. However, the woman lets this intuition be drowned out by the noise of her hatred, and she fails to return to the intuition in quieter moments. Her interior act of consenting to her hatred when it arises—the act of continuing to feel the way she feels and allowing her hatred to swell, without taking the opportunity to examine whether her emotion is appropriate to the situation—is morally bad and worthy of blame. Assuming that the neighbor is not a serious threat to her way of life, the woman’s hatred is unfitting. It is inconsistent with her own proper functioning and she is corrupted as she indulges it.

Many of us have heard the phrase “emotions are not good or bad; they just are.” It can make psychological sense to say this under certain circumstances—for example, when a person judges that his or her present emotion is bad and he or she is a terrible person for feeling it, to the point that guilt or shame effectively holds the original emotion in place, not allowing it to dissipate. However, this therapeutic strategy is best considered relative to an ethical perspective that acknowledges (with compassion) that certain emotions, felt in certain ways, are good for us: they are modes of recognition, discernment, or enjoyment that we could not and would not want to do without, whereas other emotions are bad for us: they are ways of misapprehending what is happening and inappropriately being moved. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, no emotion is morally neutral inasmuch
as it is subject to reason and choice. An emotion is either suitable to a situation or it is not. When considering what is meant by “suitable,” it is best to imagine a large target that includes a range of responses that are consistent with good human functioning, rather than focusing too intently on the bull’s-eye and seeking one correct response. What is most to be avoided is missing the target completely.

Finally, there are some emotions that incorporate explicit moral judgments into their structure. For example, we might hear on the radio about a government’s violent repression of its own people or its oppression of a geographical neighbor. As we picture acts of brutality, as described by the reporter, we undergo an interior motion of dissonance and recoil. We might also feel the impulse to rise up and defend the victims and punish the offenders. We might judge that what the offenders are doing is morally wrong. We might judge, further, that the offenders are evil. Our emotion thus becomes, in part, a hatred of certain actions and the people who are committing them. This is not simply an emotion that sits alongside a moral judgment; it is a moral emotion. To call an emotion a moral emotion is not to say that it is good. Rather, it is to say that the emotion has as its defining focus an object of perception or imagination (such as a person or a situation) that we judge to be morally good or bad. Moral judgments can be wrong, and the emotions that are informed by them can be misguided. For example, many of us hold that it is morally wrong to assume that a person is evil through and through. We hold that it is thus problematic to indulge an emotion in which we experience only dissonance and recoil, with no accompanying resonance with the basic humanity of the other.

I introduce the morality of emotion not because I am concerned in this book about evaluating the goodness or badness of particular emotional states. I am not. However, an interest in ethical self-cultivation lies in the background of this project. I take it that many of us would like to arrive at a better understanding of the emotions partly because we would like to alter some of our emotional habits. We would like to experience more love or joy, or decrease the frequency with which we experience self-lacerating emotions. Yet if we wish to encourage certain emotional states and discourage others, we must understand the sorts of states with which we are dealing. How are we to understand our emotions such that it makes sense to say that we can shape them, even as we are shaped by the objects that enter our awareness and cause us a stir? Until we can answer this question, any attempt to shape our emotions in a particular way, in light of our moral values, will come up short. We might get lucky and find a technique that allows us to have a desired effect on our emotions, but the ideal is to find a technique that makes sense to us so that
we can apply it intelligently. In this book, I seek to answer the question highlighted above by examining Aquinas’s understanding of the structure of emotion and by considering, in the process, the relationship between emotions and the powers by which we exercise our moral agency.

THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTION

Just as our emotions can be of moral significance, they can also be of religious significance. As we will discuss in chapter 1, the religious has to do with what humans regard as “really real” and of the utmost importance in life. It has to do with what humans regard as the “elements and processes within and beneath ordinary experience.” Something is of religious significance if it bears on the way one construes the underlying nature of things, or it bears on what one does to order one’s life and community in relation to what one takes to be the deepest or currently most salient source of one’s well-being.

Emotions play a notable role in the lives of many people who participate in religion. Ordinary observation indicates that emotions such as fear and love draw many people into the heart of a community’s religion. Moreover, a religion functions, in turn, to shape these emotions so that they reflect, as far as possible, what the people believe or intuit to be the sacred order of things. Thus, a religion might enable adherents to experience certain emotions in relation to religious objects. For example, it might enable people to experience an intense love for God (when God is encountered, say, in the words of a rousing sermon) or a fear of ancestral spirits (when the spirits are encountered, say, in a family member’s illness). A religion might also enable adherents to alter emotions that concern more ordinary objects, but objects that are viewed in religious perspective. For example, it might enable people to call into question and thus diminish the intensity of a sexual love that they experience for someone else’s partner, or it might help people to be more patient when encountering a neighbor’s contrary will. By enabling people to redirect the course of certain emotions, especially socially disruptive emotions, religions function to uphold a particular morality.

What is an emotion that it can be directed toward a religious object or toward an ordinary object that appears against a religious horizon? How are we constituted, as humans, that we can be moved by such objects, and we can also have an influence over how we are moved? When we ask these questions in light of the study of religion they appear especially complex, for they suggest the possibility that as humans we are sometimes moved—or think we are moved—by powers or truths that are present to us in some way yet are beyond our intellectual grasp. We might think it is important
to be well moved in relation to the source of all being, the power of life, a manifestation of limitless compassion, or a message from the spirit world. Yet we might also be unsure what to make of such emotions, partly because of the mysterious nature of their objects. In this book I focus primarily on Aquinas’s account of ordinary human emotions. I pay attention, however, to some of the implications of his account for understanding the relationship between religion and emotion. Specifically, I examine how objects of perception or imagination that appear to bear on our well-being can also appear to be religious or of religious significance, such that we are moved not simply with emotion but with religious emotion or emotion that has a religious dimension.

When we hear the term “religious emotion,” we might think of what some Christians call “religious affections.” Jonathan Edwards, who wrote an influential treatise on the religious affections, defines an “affection” as a “lively and vigorous exercise of the inclination” by which “the soul is carried out towards . . . things in view of approving them, being pleased with and inclined to them”—or an inclination by which “the soul opposes the things in view, in disapproving them; and in being displeased with, averse from, and rejecting them.” Affections are “religious” when they are directed to “God and divine things.” Thus, one might have a “lively and vigorous” love for God and a similar hatred for sin. Edwards distinguishes, further, between “true” and “counterfeit” religious affections. “Truly gracious” religious affections reveal “the saving influences of the Spirit of God”; “false and delusive” religious affections do not.

Aquinas does not employ the term “religious affection” as an analytical category. He does refer to affections (affectus) or interior motions of the intellectual appetite (the will) or (less frequently) the superior appetite (appetitus superior) with the understanding that these appetitive motions can take various objects. He also refers, of course, to love for God, hope in God, and the like, which we might wish to call “religious affections.” Sometimes Aquinas uses the term “affections” to refer to a broad range of inclinations, including inclinations that engage the intellectual appetite and those that engage the lower, sensory appetite. However, he most often uses the term to refer specifically to motions of the will relative to objects that we apprehend as good or bad by the power of our intellect (which can be extended by a gift of grace). He refers to “simple acts of the will” that occur “without passion or commotion of the soul.”

I am interested in emotions, rather than affections. I analyze as emotions what Aquinas calls passions (passiones), which are mediated by the body and do involve a “commotion of the soul.” With respect to religion and emo-
tion, I seek to show how an emotion can arise in relation to a sensible object that appears to disclose a religious truth, mediate sacred power, provoke religious questions, or the like. I show, that is, how an emotion can have or acquire a religious dimension. I do not deny the significance of “affections of the will” for Aquinas. I discuss some of these in later chapters. However, I consider these motions as they relate to emotions. I leave the focused study of the will to others. In my view, what Aquinas says about the affections that we experience as embodied beings is best understood by starting with the emotions and then considering how the emotions function in relation to motions of the will.

I do not seek to distinguish in this book between true and false religious emotions—between emotions that are true in their religious dimension and those that are false—or between emotions that are caused in a special way by God and those that are not. Making such distinctions in anything but the most formal terms would require articulating and defending a view of the truth of reality, in relation to what I take to be Aquinas’s view of the truth. That would require a work of metaphysics or theology. I am more interested in common religious questions and longings, which tend to accompany religious beliefs and are important in their own right. Asking religious questions in relation to various objects of experience can arouse what I take to be religious emotions or emotions with a religious dimension. By the same token, asking a broader range of religious and other questions about such emotions can create some mental space around them, which can put us in a better position to give them direction.

THE STUDY OF AQUINAS ON THE EMOTIONS

The emotions ought to be studied by anyone who has a serious interest in ethical or religious self-understanding and the cultivation of virtue. But why study Aquinas on this topic? What makes his way of thinking about the emotions so special? Let me introduce some notable features of his account.

First, Aquinas holds that emotions are modes of tending in relation to objects of perception or imagination that we assess to be significant for our own or another’s well-being. Emotions are interior motions that are aroused by and oriented with respect to certain objects of “cognition.” Accordingly, Aquinas’s account allows us to attend, as any compelling account of the emotions must, to the cognitive dimension of emotion. Yet he interprets this dimension with flexibility. He includes within its realm not only propositional states, such as states of believing-that and judging-that, but also (and most importantly for the initial formation of many emotions) nonpropositional states,